Trump and the myth of strong American institutions, by Usman Sarki

“Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any other“—  John Adams

Few observations capture the enduring dilemma of democratic governance as succinctly as this warning by John Adams. Long before the modern age of mass democracy, Adams understood that constitutions and institutions, however carefully designed, cannot sustain themselves without the moral discipline of those entrusted with power. Laws may structure authority and define procedures, but they cannot compel virtue. Ultimately, the success or failure of any constitutional order depends upon the character, restraint and civic responsibility of those who operate it.

For many decades, the United States was widely regarded as the world’s most enduring example of institutional resilience. Its constitutional architecture, crafted in the late eighteenth century by figures such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, was believed to embody a sophisticated system of checks and balances capable of restraining even the most ambitious leaders. Political scientists frequently cited the American system as proof that strong institutions and not powerful personalities are the ultimate guarantors of democratic stability.

Yet the political turbulence surrounding the presidencies of Donald Trump has forced a reconsideration of this long-standing assumption. What unfolded during these years did not merely represent partisan political conflict. Rather, it exposed the fragile foundations of a widely held belief that institutions, once properly designed, possess an automatic capacity to defend democratic order. The lesson emerging from this experience is both sobering and instructive, that institutions are not self-executing mechanisms.

Their strength depends fundamentally on political culture, civic virtue and the willingness of leaders to exercise restraint within the boundaries of law and tradition. The American constitutional system was deliberately constructed to prevent the concentration of power in one hand. Madison and his contemporaries believed that ambition would counter ambition, that is to say the executive would check the legislature, the legislature would check the executive and the judiciary would arbitrate disputes between them. Federalism would further distribute authority between national and state governments, creating multiple layers of accountability.

For more than two centuries, this framework functioned with remarkable continuity. The American republic survived a civil war, economic depression and two world wars while preserving the essential structure of constitutional governance. Because of this historical record, the United States came to be regarded as the ultimate demonstration of institutional durability.

Yet the stability of that system depended not only on formal rules but also on an elaborate network of unwritten norms.

These norms included respect for judicial independence, acceptance of electoral outcomes, restraint in the use of executive authority and a shared understanding that political competition must ultimately yield to constitutional order. Political scientists often referred to these practices as constitutional conventions. They were rarely codified because they were assumed to be self-evident obligations of responsible leadership.

The Trump era demonstrated how vulnerable such assumptions can be.

One of the most dramatic episodes occurred on January 6, 2021, when supporters of President Trump stormed the United States Capitol in an attempt to disrupt the congressional certification of the presidential election results. The attack on Congress represented an extraordinary moment in American political history. The legislative heart of the republic was physically assaulted during a constitutional process central to the peaceful transfer of power.

Other controversies further strained institutional norms. Attempts were made to pressure state election officials to reconsider certified results. Federal agencies found themselves drawn into intense political confrontation. Career civil servants and judges were sometimes publicly criticised or replaced, raising concerns about the erosion of long-standing traditions of bureaucratic and judicial neutrality.

Foreign policy decisions under Trump also revived constitutional debate. The president’s unilateral decision to order military strikes against Iran without explicit congressional authorisation provoked renewed discussion about the balance of war powers between Congress and the executive. Although the Constitution assigns to Congress the authority to declare war, successive administrations have gradually expanded presidential authority in this domain.

Critics argued that such actions represented a further shift of power toward the executive branch. At the same time, discussions within parts of the Trump political movement about dramatically restructuring the federal bureaucracy, including proposals to retire large numbers of career civil servants, raised concerns among some observers about the potential politicisation of the administrative state. Debates about the role of prominent private-sector figures such as Elon Musk in shaping future government reforms also illustrated the growing intersection between political power and private influence.

The judiciary, Congress and state authorities nevertheless continued to function, often under intense pressure. Courts issued rulings affirming legal constraints on executive authority. State officials defended electoral procedures. Many civil servants adhered to established administrative norms despite political turbulence. These responses demonstrated that institutions can indeed possess resilience. Yet they also revealed that institutional survival often depends less on structures than on the individuals who operate them.

In other words, the guardians of the system were not institutions alone but the people entrusted with their stewardship. This insight becomes even clearer when the Trump era is compared with earlier constitutional crises in American history, particularly the Watergate scandal that engulfed the presidency of Richard Nixon in the early 1970s. The Watergate scandal exposed extensive abuses of executive authority. Yet the institutional response was decisive. Congress conducted bipartisan investigations, the judiciary compelled the release of evidence and senior political leaders ultimately placed constitutional integrity above partisan loyalty. Nixon resigned in 1974 after it became clear that impeachment and removal were inevitable.

The contrast between Watergate and the crises of the Trump era suggests that institutional strength ultimately depends not only on constitutional design but also on the willingness of political actors to defend democratic norms. Where bipartisan commitment to constitutional principles exists, institutions can respond effectively to crisis. 

Where such commitment weakens, the institutional response becomes uncertain and contested. The lesson is not unique to the United States.

If the most established constitutional system in the modern world can experience such strain, then younger democracies must be even more vigilant about the moral foundations upon which their institutions rest. For many developing democracies, the phrase “build strong institutions” has become a central mantra of political reform. International organisations frequently advocate institutional strengthening as the primary pathway toward stability and development.

There is wisdom in this emphasis. Transparent procedures, independent courts, professional civil services and accountable legislatures are essential components of modern governance. Without such structures, political systems can easily degenerate into personalised rule. Yet the American experience reminds us that institutional architecture alone cannot guarantee democratic success. Even the most sophisticated constitutional design cannot substitute for political integrity.

This lesson carries particular relevance for Nigeria.

In our own political environment, the language of “strong institutions” has become commonplace in both official and public discourses. Yet the reality on the ground often reveals a troubling erosion of the principles that institutions are meant to uphold. One manifestation of this erosion is the gradual blurring of constitutional distinctions between the executive and the legislature. In theory, Nigeria’s constitutional order rests upon the doctrine of separation of powers whereby the executive governs, the legislature scrutinises and legislates and the judiciary interprets the law.

In practice, however, these boundaries are often indistinct. Legislative oversight sometimes gives way to accommodation, while institutional independence can become subordinate to political alliances and executive influence. Equally troubling is the transformation of public office into a system of patronage. Positions within government are too often distributed not on the basis of competence and public service but as rewards for loyalty or political convenience.

When offices intended to serve the nation become instruments of personal networks and patronage, institutional authority inevitably weakens. Under such circumstances, the language of “strong institutions” risks becoming an illusion.

Institutions cannot remain strong when they are rendered ineffectual by patronage, weakened by the erosion of oversight or subordinated to personal influence. Their strength ultimately lies in the integrity with which they are operated and the seriousness with which their responsibilities are discharged.

Nigeria’s democratic future will therefore depend not merely on preserving the formal structures of constitutional governance but on restoring the ethical foundations upon which those structures must stand. For democracies, the greatest danger rarely arrives in the form of sudden collapse. It comes instead through slow corrosion by way of the quiet transformation of institutions from instruments of national service into extensions of personal power.

Like termites eating unseen into the trunk of a great tree, the decay may remain invisible for years. Yet once the internal fibres weaken, even the strongest structure can eventually give way. The experience of recent years therefore reveals a deeper truth about governance. Institutions do matter, but their strength is not automatic. They derive their vitality from the integrity of those entrusted with their operation and from the civic culture that surrounds them. In the end, the durability of democracy rests not only on laws and offices but on character and morals.

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