France and the Strategic Balance of West Africa: Why Nigeria Must Still Pay Attention, by Usman Sarki

“The greatness of a country is not measured by the extent of its territory, but by the character of its people”—  Alexis de Tocqueville

France occupies a controversial place in the imagination of many Africans today. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, public anger, coup-driven nationalistic hysteria, and geo-political realignments have combined to cast France as an adversary. Anti-French sentiment has become a form of political capital for military rulers who seek legitimacy by weaponising historical grievances. Yet beyond the hysteria, rhetoric and symbolism, France remains one of the world’s most consequential states, and its role in West Africa, whether shrinking, shifting or contested, still matters profoundly to Nigeria.

For a country that shares long borders with Niger, a turbulent Lake Chad Basin, and a direct confrontation with Boko Haram, ISWAP and other terrorist formations, Nigeria cannot afford sentimental readings of French power. The current rupture between France and parts of the Sahel is not merely a diplomatic quarrel. It is a structural transformation of our regional security architecture with direct implications for Nigeria’s national stability, strategic posture and foreign policy orientation. At this critical moment, it is essential to step back from the noise and confusion and examine why France still matters to Nigeria and to Africa.

France is a great military and strategic power in the world that is often underestimated in global discussions dominated by the United States, China and Russia. But it remains a formidable strategic actor. It is a nuclear-armed state with an independent deterrent, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and one of the few countries capable of sustained expeditionary operations on multiple continents. Its intelligence networks, surveillance technologies, naval reach, space technologies and defence industry place it in a category above ordinary higher middle powers.

In the wider framework of European security, France anchors the continent’s military capability. With the United Kingdom no longer central to European Union defence planning, France has effectively become Europe’s leading military power as evidenced by the key role it has been playing in shoring up Ukraine’s war effort. For West Africa, this matters: France is still the only Western country with deep institutional knowledge of the region, long-term operational experience in the Sahel, and pre-positioned forces across parts of Africa and its overseas territories. In short, France has the capacity to shape events whether we like it or not. Its decisions ripple across West Africa, providing stability in some cases and creating vacuums in others.

It is for these and other important reasons that the rise, retreat and aftershocks of French power in the Sahel and greater West Africa should be of interest to scholars and policy makers in Nigeria. The collapse of security in the Sahel did not begin with French  presence, and it has not ended with France’s withdrawal. France’s military interventions notably “Operation Serval” in 2013 and “Operation Barkhane” thereafter, were launched at the request of African governments who were on the verge of being overrun by terrorist forces. Whatever their shortcomings, these interventions halted the immediate collapse of Mali and slowed the spread of extremist rule in the Sahel region.

I can state this without any fears of arousing controversy because I was a first-hand witness of the  events in Mali. I visited that country as part of a UN Security Council delegation in 2014, and participated in interactions with the country’s government leaders, military commanders, opposition elements and civil society organisations. I also visited and conversed with the French force commanders and UN contingents on the ground. I travelled to Mopti and other  hotspots outside Bamako, and witnessed the extent of the challenges faced by Mali, and how near the rebel forces came to overrun the country in 2012.  

But over time, France became entangled in the complexities of Sahelian politics. Military rulers in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey saw advantage in turning public frustration against France. Instead of reforming governance, addressing social grievances, or building inclusive political systems, they opted for a simpler narrative: France is to blame. The result was a strategic rupture. French troops were expelled, cooperation frameworks dismantled, and Russian “Africa Corps” forces welcomed in a surge of anti-Western sentiment. Far from solving the security crisis, these changes have emboldened terrorist networks. Vast ungoverned spaces have emerged such as the Liptako-Gourma Axis, borders have become porous; extremist supply routes have opened; and the equilibrium that once existed however imperfectly, has collapsed.

These developments do not affect Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso only. They flow in every direction. Benin Republic is already beginning to feel the effects of this vacuum. Nigeria also sits at the receiving end of these shockwaves. It has to be acknowledged however reluctantly that France’s absence directly affects Nigeria’s security, as evidenced by the widening crisis that the country is confronted with right now. Nigeria’s northern frontier has always been shaped by the wider Sahel. The fall of Libya, the spread of arms, the rise of Boko Haram, and the entrenchment of ISWAP all emerged from broader regional dynamics. Today, as France withdraws and the Alliance of Sahel States, AES, aligns itself with non-Western actors, the risks for Nigeria keep on multiplying.

Without French aerial surveillance, reconnaissance, drones, and intelligence sharing, the monitoring of trans-Sahelian movements has weakened drastically. Terrorist groups now exploit the reduced oversight to move fighters, logistics and weaponry towards Northern Nigeria. The Lake Chad Basin, despite the resilience of the Multi-national Joint Task Force, MJTF, remains vulnerable to external inputs. The AES’s break from ECOWAS and the militarisation and externalisation of Sahelian diplomacy have further fractured an already fragile security environment. With ECOWAS weakened and its influence challenged, regional mechanisms that Nigeria once relied upon for stability are now uncertain and tottering on the brink of collapse.  

Nigeria must therefore study France’s retreat not with satisfaction but with strategic sobriety. A destabilised Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso is ultimately a destabilised Nigeria. Here, it is necessary that Nigeria’s diplomacy and security policies should study the consequences of disengagement from French and European linkages and support. Understanding the wider strategic environment is always a vital aspect of foreign policy and security considerations. Disavowing the role of France, Europe and the wider regional dynamics in the maintenance of security in the Sahel and West Africa, is a recipe for failure with dire consequences.

It is important, therefore, that Nigeria understands that French power does not exist in isolation. Through its influence within the European Union and NATO, France shapes a vast array of policies that directly affect Nigeria: trade, migration, development assistance, security financing and diplomatic positions. The EU remains Nigeria’s largest export market and its biggest development partner. No European policy on Africa is made without Paris’ input. Nigeria’s quest for a place in the permanent category of the United Nations Security Council would be a non-starter without the support and positive nod of France and the rest of the EU member states.  

Understanding France means understanding the European position on sanctions, governance standards, democratic norms, and security assistance. Whether Nigeria wants to renegotiate trade protocols, attract investment, expand energy cooperation, or lobby on political issues, France is a gate-keeper in Brussels. Thus, disengagement or indifference is not in Nigeria’s interest. What Nigeria direly needs now is strategic engagement and not self-isolation on the basis of sentiments or fears about hegemony and all that. Consequently, Nigeria should draw some vital lessons from France’s two decades or more in the Sahel.

These include the fact that counter-terrorism is more a matter of political dexterity than military action. France’s overwhelming reliance on military force never resolved the root causes of extremism which are marginalisation, local grievances, ethnic tensions, corruption, and weak governance. Nigeria must internalise this lesson in its own fight against insurgency, banditry and militant separatism. Second lesson is that public sentiment cannot be ignored.  The Sahelian governments that once welcomed France later turned against it when people perceived its presence as infringing national dignity. Nigeria must also manage perceptions in its own internal operations, ensuring communities feel seen, heard and respected.

The third lesson to be learned is foreign partnerships must be aligned with local autonomy and legitimacy. France was working with governments increasingly disconnected from their people, hence the popular resentment against these governments also became sources of grievances against France. Nigeria must ensure its security initiatives in the country, especially in the North, involve traditional authorities, civil society, youth and local governance structures. The fourth lesson to be learned is geopolitical vacuums will always be filled by other actors. As France left, Russia stepped in to take its place in the AES zone. If Nigeria withdraws from its responsibilities in the areas of security and human development, other actors whether state or non-state, will fill the space and constitute alternative forces within the country.  

When everything is placed in the balance of probability, the truth simply is that France matters to Nigeria. France remains a major player in every domain that affects Nigeria’s future whether in security, diplomacy, economics, technology or regional governance. Its influence may be contested, but it is far from diminished. Ignoring France or viewing it solely through the lens of Sahelian anger would be intellectually lazy and strategically dangerous. Nigeria must engage France not as a former colonial power, or a regional competitor, but as a geopolitical actor whose decisions shape our environment. The real task before Nigeria is not to become a part in the quarrel between France and the Sahel juntas, but to understand the implications, anticipate the consequences, and pursue a foreign policy rooted in national interest rather than sentimental expediency.

France’s position in West Africa is changing, but its importance has not evaporated. If anything, its retreat has revealed how deeply interconnected our region has been with French power militarily, diplomatically and economically. Nigeria must respond with clarity, maturity and strategic foresight. In the new landscape of shifting alliances, great-power competition and rising insecurity, France still matters. The question is not whether Nigeria should engage France, but how and to what end. Our national security, regional leadership and continental relevance depend on getting that answer right.

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